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Notes 
Neither Here nor There: 
The Bisexual Struggle for American Asylum 
 
JACLYN GROSS* 
Recently, it has become increasingly difficult for foreign nationals to successfully gain 
refuge in the United States from persecution in their home countries. The year 1990 
marked the first time that the United States granted asylum to a homosexual claimant 
on the grounds of membership in a “particular social group.” Since then, several 
LGBTI asylum seekers have been granted the right to build new lives in the United 
States. Most recently, the country has increasingly included the transgender 
community in this group of fortunate individuals. Bisexuals, however, despite 
comprising over fifty percent of the LGBTI population, continue to be a significant 
subset of the community that consistently faces the most difficulty in attaining asylum 
in the United States. Asylum seekers who are discriminated against based on visible 
traits face far fewer roadblocks than those attempting to prove persecution for not 
being heterosexual.  
 
There are fundamental societal misunderstandings about bisexuality and its presence 
in everyday life, and the judiciary suffers from a lack of targeted training that could 
help overcome this deficiency. Accordingly, the judiciary must take steps to prevent 
these deficiencies from resulting in stereotypes and inaccurate credibility 
determinations that may ultimately act as a bar to asylum. This Note proposes that 
all judges making asylum determinations be subject to a training program 
comparable to that of the LGBTI-specific module required by United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services for Refugee, Asylum and International 
Operations officials. With this training, the personal biases of decisionmakers that 
lead to skepticism of a claimant’s credibility can be reduced, thus avoiding 
miscategorizations of individuals who stray from perceived gender or sexual binaries. 
 * J.D. Candidate 2018, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 2007, University of 
California, Santa Cruz. I want to thank Heron Greenesmith for alerting me to the intricacies of this issue and 
for her indispensable feedback. I also want to express my gratitude to Professor Dorit Reiss and Karen 
Musalo for their time and guidance. This Note is dedicated to all the family and friends who have loved and 
supported me unconditionally throughout my journey in law school. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1900s, “non-heterosexuals” were denied entry into the 
United States because they were seen as “constitutional psychopathic 
inferiors.”1 In 1979, the United States Surgeon General directed the 
Public Health Service to cease its practice of excluding homosexual 
immigrants, but the Assistant Attorney General upheld the ban.2 At that 
point, asylum seekers who admitted to having sexual relations with both 
genders were put in the same category as homosexuals and denied 
protections.3 It was not until 1990 that the United States granted asylum 
to sexual minorities on account of sexual orientation being an immutable 
trait that made them eligible for protection as “members of a particular 
social group.”4 From there, the challenge facing bisexual individuals went 
from an outdated view of being “too gay” to enter the country, to needing 
to prove they are “gay enough” to be granted asylum.5 As discussed later, 
there are a multitude of asylum cases demonstrating the personal biases 
or a fundamental misunderstanding of sexual orientation present in 
judges’ rulings. 
 1. Ray Sin, Does Sexual Fluidity Challenge Sexual Binaries? The Case of Bisexual Immigrants 
from 1967–2012, 18 SEXUALITIES 413, 416 (2015). 
 2. Id. at 418. 
 3. Id. at 426. 
 4. See Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990); Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 5. Sin, supra note 1, at 429. 
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Today, the American LGBTI6 community has witnessed a 
progression in its legal protections.7 However, these anti-discrimination 
laws apply to those who are already legally in the United States, while 
LGBTI asylum seekers must satisfy a heavy burden of proof to be granted 
relief. While it will always be necessary for Asylum Officers and 
Immigration Judges to vet one’s credibility in sexual minority asylum 
cases, considerable work still remains insofar as bisexual claimants are 
concerned. Some bisexual asylum seekers feel the need to identify as gay 
or lesbian during the asylum process, for fear that their application will 
be denied if they continue to identify as bisexual.8 Should they 
subsequently want to get married to a United States citizen of the 
opposite sex, however, they could potentially face removal for 
committing fraud on their application.9 This, too, demonstrates the idea 
that someone can be told they are not “gay enough” to be granted asylum 
by the United States.10 
 6. Sexual minorities are perceived through several lenses and the pertinent vocabulary in these 
discussions can manifest itself in many different forms. Each use has its own meaning and relevance 
depending on the larger scope of the discussion. The most common acronym is LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Transgender), but it has recently been expanded to include individuals who are “questioning” 
or “queer” (LGBTQ) and “intersex” (LGBTI), among others. For the purposes of this Note, the 
community is addressed as LGBTI, the acronym now being employed by both the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees as well as the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services training 
directorate for Refugee, Asylum and International Operations officers. See Maks Levin, UNHCR Leads 
in LGBTI Refugee, Asylum Seeker Protection, UNHCR (Dec. 24, 2015), http://www.unhcr.org/ 
afr/news/latest/2015/12/567bb2869/unhcr-leads-in-lgbti-refugee-asylum-seeker-protection.html; 
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., RAIO DIRECTORATE, GUIDANCE FOR ADJUDICATING LESBIAN, 
GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND INTERSEX (LGBTI) REFUGEE AND ASYLUM CLAIMS (2011).  
 As sexual orientation and gender identity become more understood as fluid rather than binary, 
it can be difficult for some to keep up with the ever-changing terminology. One of the most inclusive 
definitions for sexual orientations that would historically be labeled simply as “bisexual” states that 
“the term b+ [is] an umbrella term for people who have the potential for sexual, emotional, and/or 
romantic attraction to more than one gender. This includes people who may identify as bisexual, 
pansexual, fluid, queer, and questioning as well as people who do not but whose emotions, desires 
and/or actions have the capacity to occur across more than one point along the gender spectrum.” 
Heron Greenesmith, Happy #BiWeek!, LGBTQ COMMUNITY LIAISON, CITY OF SOMERVILLE (Sept. 21, 
2015, 12:01 AM), http://somervillelgbtq.blogspot.com. However, this Note uses “bisexual” when 
referring to b+ individuals in order to remain consistent with the term used most throughout the 
articles and cases referenced herein, as well as to suggest an expansion of the original term’s 
application. 
  Additionally, when not discussing a specific person whose gender identity is known, this Note 
refers to individuals with variations of the pronoun “them,” rather than as “he” or “she,” out of respect 
for persons of nonbinary, unspecified, and unknown social gender. 
 7. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Windsor v. United States, 699 
F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, 
H.R. 1755, 113th Cong. (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 8. Interview with Okan Sengun, LGBT Coordinator and San Francisco Asylum Office Liaison  
of Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n, N. Cal. Chapter, in San Francisco, Cal. (Sept. 9, 2016).  
 9. Id.  
 10. Sin, supra note 1, at 429. 
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Current asylum laws cover persecuted bisexual persons in the same 
manner as they cover other persecuted groups. Unfortunately, the 
interpretation and administration of these laws can be skewed by the 
immigration officials’ perceptions of claimants. Part I of this Note 
explains the basics of the United States asylum process and the history of 
recent immigration reform. Part II introduces the difficulties that sexual 
minorities face when adjudicating asylum claims and then further 
delineates issues specific to bisexual asylum seekers. Part III explores 
how the legal and social views of immutability have changed, and 
continue to change. Finally, Part IV offers recommendations on how to 
reconcile existing precedent with changing perspectives. Specifically, this 
Part suggests both introducing legislation mandating continued training 
for immigration judges and setting a precedent that updates the legal 
meaning of “immutability.” 
I.  THE ASYLUM PROCESS  
A. OVERVIEW 
Pursuant to United States statute and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) Convention and Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, a “refugee” is defined as: 
“[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s 
nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is 
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that 
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution 
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion.”11 
The burden of proof falls on the claimant, requiring them to prove 
that they meet the definition of refugee by way of persecution for one of 
the aforementioned reasons.12 The asylum seeker does not enjoy a 
presumption of credibility for their testimony or evidence.13 Only if the 
judge does not make an explicitly adverse finding will the individual have 
a rebuttable presumption of credibility on appeal.14 
The United States immigration system provides two routes to 
refugee status: affirmative applications and defensive applications.15 The 
affirmative process begins with an asylum seeker who is physically in the 
United States submitting the appropriate forms to the United States 
 11. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012); see also United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, United 
Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 14 (Oct. 4, 1967). 
 12. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2012). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2018). 
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Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), complying with other 
formalities such as fingerprinting and background checks, and being 
interviewed by an Asylum Officer.16 If the Asylum Officer denies an 
affirmative application, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
issues a Notice to Appear, removal proceedings are triggered, and the 
person’s case is referred for a de novo review to an Immigration Judge at 
the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”).17 The alternate 
scenario is the defensive process, which occurs when DHS begins 
removal proceedings after apprehending an individual who is already 
present in or attempting to enter the United States without proper legal 
documentation.18 An individual who is apprehended in such a manner 
can petition for asylum as a defense against removal from the United 
States.19 At this point, the two processes converge as the asylum seeker 
attempts to convince the Immigration Judge to grant them permission to 
remain in the United States.20 
If the Immigration Judge does not grant asylum, or if the 
government chooses to contest a favorable decision, the case can be 
appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).21 The BIA 
typically does a “paper review” of the case, as opposed to hearing 
courtroom testimony, and makes a determination based on the 
information transferred from the Immigration Court.22 From there, BIA 
decisions may be eligible for review in a federal Court of Appeals.23 
Except in rare cases where the Supreme Court grants certiorari, Courts 
of Appeals are the final review available, and their decisions determine 
whether the asylum seeker is permanently removed or if the case will be 
remanded back down to the BIA.24 
The following graph illustrates the process for both affirmative and 
defensive applicants once DHS initiates the removal proceedings 
process: 
 16. See id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, Board of Immigration 
Appeals, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals (last visited Mar.3, 2018). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Flow Chart: Steps in the Asylum Process, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., 
http://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/Asylum%20Flow%20Chart.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2018). 
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B. MEMBERSHIP IN A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP 
Membership in a particular social group can be the means of 
granting asylum to individuals who do not fit one of the other four 
grounds available.25 The UNHCR directs decisionmakers in cases 
pertaining to social group claims to consider whether the group as 
asserted “is defined: (1) by an innate, unchangeable characteristic, (2) by 
a past temporary or voluntary status that is unchangeable because of its 
historical permanence, or (3) by a characteristic or association that is so 
fundamental to human dignity that group members should not be 
compelled to forsake it.”26 The same guidelines make clear that courts 
have previously concluded that women, homosexuals, and families are 
examples of accepted social groups for the purposes of granting asylum.27 
In 1985, the BIA’s decision in Matter of Acosta defined a “particular 
social group” as individuals who share a “common characteristic . . . that 
defines the group, [and] must be one that the members of the group 
either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is 
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.”28 With this 
decision, the court held that persecution of social groups was comparable 
 25. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012). 
 26. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a 
Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02, at 3 (May 7, 2002). 
 27. Id. Note that the use of the word “homosexual” in these Guidelines predates the UNCHR and 
the U.S. government’s updates that now provide immigration adjudicators with more inclusive 
terminology. 
 28. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). 
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to the other four grounds for asylum under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.29 The court’s subsequent ruling in Matter of Toboso-
Alfonso expanded membership in a particular social group to include 
homosexual claimants.30 In Toboso-Alfonso, a Cuban national testified 
that the “[g]overnment register[ed] and maintain[ed] files on all 
homosexuals” and that he was brought in every few months for hearings 
that involved a physical examination and questions about his sexual 
relationships.31 He was often detained without being charged, sent to a 
forced labor camp for two months, and harassed by his neighbors.32 The 
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), one of the 
DHS’s predecessor agencies, argued that Toboso-Alfonso was not a 
member of a particular social group, but did not challenge the 
Immigration Judge’s finding that homosexuality is an immutable trait.33 
Without any evidence to the contrary, the BIA ruled against the INS’s 
assertion that Toboso-Alfonso did not satisfy the criteria for membership 
in a particular social group and instead, granted his petition for asylum.34 
Ten years after the Toboso-Alfonso decision, the Ninth Circuit heard 
Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, which involved a gay Mexican man with a 
female sexual identity.35 The court considered whether, for asylum 
purposes, variations of sexual minorities could also be considered a 
particular social group.36 Ultimately, the court determined that he did 
satisfy the social group requirement, and that he had a well-founded fear 
of persecution if he were to be sent back to Mexico.37 
Citing Toboso-Alfonso, the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent decision in 
Karouni v. Gonzales cemented the idea that “all alien homosexuals are 
members of a ‘particular social group.’”38 Karouni was a Lebanese man 
seeking asylum because he feared that, if removed back to Lebanon, he 
would face persecution for being homosexual, suffering from AIDS, and 
being Shi’ite.39 United States Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, in 
deciding against asylum for the petitioner, argued that the Lebanese 
government did not arrest someone for merely being “homosexual,” but 
rather because they had engaged in “homosexual conduct.”40 The court 
disagreed and said that if Karouni had already engaged in such acts, or if 
the government believed him to have done so, he could be persecuted for 
 29. Id. 
 30. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990). 
 31. Id. at 820–21. 
 32. Id. at 821. 
 33. Id. at 822. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 36. See id. at 1087, 1093. 
 37. Id. at 1099. 
 38. Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 39. Id. at 1166. 
 40. Id. at 1172. 
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it regardless of his future actions.41 The Ninth Circuit also reiterated an 
earlier ruling stating that “even a ten percent chance that the applicant 
will be persecuted in the future is enough to establish eligibility for 
asylum.”42 The court characterized the Attorney General’s argument as 
akin to telling Karouni that he would have to change a fundamental trait 
and “forsake the intimate contact and enduring personal bond” protected 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.43 This decision 
indicated that Karouni was entitled to the same fundamental right to 
intimate contact as seen in non-asylum related LGBTI legal victories.44 
Further, the court refused to adopt a distinction between homosexual 
identity and homosexual conduct when it came to indicators of an 
immutable trait for the purpose of establishing membership in a 
particular social group.45 
In 2002, the UNHCR released guidelines on social group claims in 
an attempt to reconcile a “protected characteristics”or 
“immutability”approach with a “social perception approach.”46 The 
guidelines characterized a “particular social group” as a “group of 
persons who share a common characteristic that is often innate or 
otherwise fundamental, or who are perceived as a group by society.”47 
The disjunctive nature of the word “or” indicates a desire to show that 
both social perception and immutability are relevant factors; either is 
sufficient to satisfy the characterization. This conclusion is further 
supported by the statement that “[i]f a claimant alleges a social group 
that is based on a characteristic determined to be neither unalterable or 
fundamental, further analysis should be undertaken to determine 
whether the group is nonetheless perceived as a cognizable group in that 
society.”48 The guidelines also provide that, while persecution alone 
cannot determine a “particular social group,” it can be evidence of an 
inference that the individuals are visible to society as a recognizable 
social group.49 
C. IMMIGRATION APPEALS REFORM 
In 2002, United States Attorney General John Ashcroft 
implemented a plan to streamline the immigration appeals process.50 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. (quoting El Himri v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 43. Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1173.  
 44. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577; United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 208 (2004).  
 45. KAREN MUSALO ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL 
APPROACH 668 (4th ed. 2011). 
 46. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 26, at 3. 
 47. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 26, at 3 (emphasis added). 
 48. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 26, at 4. 
 49. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 26, at 4. 
 50. Press Release, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General 
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Among the changes made, the BIA was reduced from twenty-three 
members down to eleven, new time constraints for appeals were 
imposed, and the standard of review changed from de novo to “clearly 
erroneous.”51 A study conducted after the restructuring revealed that the 
judges with the highest percentage of rulings in favor of non-citizens 
were the ones removed from the Board.52 In turn, critics called the result 
of Ashcroft’s actions a “purge of dedicated civil servants based on a 
perception of their policy views.”53 
While Ashcroft’s plan may have reduced backlog at the BIA level, it 
led to drastic increases in anti-immigrant decisions and, consequently, 
an exponential increase in the number of federal circuit court appeals.54 
In 2001, before the restructuring, immigration cases accounted for 3% of 
all federal appeals cases, with 59% of rulings going against immigrants.55 
In 2002, the number of rulings against immigrants drastically increased 
to 86%.56 By 2005, immigration cases accounted for 17% of all federal 
appeals cases.57 A study examining 76,000 rulings by the BIA between 
1998 and 2005 found that asylum applicants who were represented by an 
attorney were awarded favorable appeals in 43% of cases in 2001, but by 
2005 were only winning 13% of appeals.58 Presently, the number of BIA 
members is up to twenty members, four of whom are listed as temporary 
members.59 
Shortly after Ashcroft’s reform, complaints arose about the 
treatment of litigants by the judges, namely biases being vocalized in 
Issues Final Rule Reforming Board of Immigration Appeals Procedures (Aug. 23, 2002), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2002/08/26/BIARestruct.pdf. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Peter J. Levinson, The Facade of Quasi-Judicial Independence in Immigration Appellate 
Adjudications, 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1154, 1163 (2004). 
 53. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar & Jonathan Peterson, 5 on Immigration Board Asked to Leave; 
Critics Call It a Purge, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/mar/12/nation/ 
na-immig12. 
 54. Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1669 
(2010); Lisa Getter & Jonathan Peterson, Speedier Rate of Deportation Rulings Assailed, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES (Jan. 5, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jan/05/nation/na-immig5 (the 
backlog in BIA cases dropped from 56,000 to 32,000 by 2004 while Courts of Appeal simultaneously 
saw a drastic increase in appeals of BIA decisions). 
 55. Getter & Peterson, supra note 54; Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling of Asylum 
Cases: Pattern of Bias Alleged, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at A1. 
 56. Getter & Peterson, supra note 54. 
 57. Getter & Peterson, supra note 54; Liptak, supra note 55.  
 58.  Julia Preston, Big Disparities in Judging of Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMES (May. 31, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/31/washington/31asylum.html.  
 59.  Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION 
REVIEW, www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals-bios (last visited Mar. 3, 2018). 
However, as recently as 2015, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) was still attempting to deal with a 
backlog of immigration cases, which it claims is due to a shortage of Immigration Judges. Oversight 
of the Executive Office for Immigration Review: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration. and 
Border Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 2 (2015) (statement of Juan P. Osuna, 
Dir., Exec. Office. for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
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court.60 Vocal biases are especially troubling in cases where the 
immigrant is of a background or culture not fully understood by the 
person deciding their asylum status. These prejudicial predispositions in 
rulings can adversely affect individuals’ pleas for asylum. Further, the 
federal appeals judges noticed that the quality of review coming from the 
Immigration Judges was suffering as they attempted to cut through more 
cases with fewer judges.61 Judge Posner wrote that the federal courts 
were receiving “either no opinion or . . . very short, unhelpful boilerplate 
opinion[s]” from Immigration Judges, making it difficult for federal 
appeals judges to give an informed review of the facts.62 
Today, this lack of information still hinders the government’s ability 
to determine which BIA judges fully comprehend the types of issues 
presented by the individuals seeking asylum from persecution faced in 
their native countries. Without an understanding of how or why the 
judges come to the conclusions that they do, it is difficult to determine 
whether they are biased or just underinformed. 
II.  DIFFICULTIES IN SEXUAL MINORITY ASYLUM CLAIMS  
A. ROLES OF ASYLUM OFFICERS AND IMMIGRATION JUDGES 
Given the relatively new recognition of sexual minorities as 
legitimate members of a “particular social group,” it is not surprising that 
these individuals still face Asylum Officers and judges at every level who 
do not know how to properly evaluate their claims. Individuals who are 
discriminated against for more visible traits, such as race, must prove 
they have a “well-founded fear of persecution” upon returning to their 
country of origin to be granted asylum.63 Meanwhile, sexual minorities 
have the added burden of also proving that they are, in fact, even part of 
the asserted social group. Personal biases on the part of decisionmakers 
can lead to skepticism of a claimant’s credibility, and lack of knowledge 
can lead to a miscategorization of a person who strays from perceived 
gender or sexual binaries. 
All United States Asylum Officers are required to complete the  
five-and-a-half-week Asylum Officer Basic Training Course.64 It focuses 
solely on educating officers on how to proceed during asylum 
adjudications.65 In addition, the Asylum Division requires that weekly 
training sessions be conducted in each of the field offices on various 
 60. Liptak, supra note 55. 
 61. Liptak, supra note 55. 
 62. Liptak, supra note 55. 
 63. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012). 
 64. See Asylum Division Training Programs, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/asylum-division-training-programs 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2018). 
 65. Id. 
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topics that are determined by supervisors to best address the needs of 
each particular site.66 A 2012 update to the Refugee, Asylum and 
International Operations (“RAIO”) training directorate offers an LGBTI-
specific module that includes definitions of central terms and relevant 
case law.67 Additionally, the training offers guidance on asking sensitive 
questions that garner necessary testimony, and distinguishes between 
factors judges should or should not allow to sway their final 
determinations.68 
Immigration Judges are appointed by the Attorney General to sit as 
an administrative judge within the EOIR.69 The attorneys then undergo 
a total of six weeks of training within the first year after their 
appointment, the initial five weeks being consecutive and the final week 
occurring after they have heard cases for six to twelve months.70 This 
training includes classroom education and shadowing established 
Immigration Judges with a focus on the laws and procedures central to 
adjudicating immigration cases.71 No LGBTI related terminology appears 
in any of the EOIR’s Immigration Court or BIA Practice Manuals, and the 
term “social group” is only included in the Immigration Court manual 
once as part of the definition for “reasonable fear standard.”72 As judges 
in the Immigration Court or on the BIA, these individuals are responsible 
for exercising independent judgment on all immigration cases, not just 
in reference to asylum.73 Accordingly, these Practice Manuals deal 
entirely with the rules of the judicial process overall, rather than 
addressing how to approach any specific substantive immigration 
issues.74 
Logically speaking, the more targeted training that Asylum Officers 
receive, the better equipped they would be to question asylum seekers 
and make determinations about the legitimacy and necessity of each 
claim. Unfortunately, as of 2017, there is not much data on whether the 
2012 updates have affected the number of LGBTI asylum cases being 
appealed. One explanation for this is that many asylum cases are 
 66. Id. 
 67. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 6.  
 68. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 6.  
 69. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2011). 
 70. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REVIEW, FACT SHEET: IMMIGRATION 
JUDGE TRAINING (2016). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, THE 
IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL (2009), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/pages/attachments/ 
2015/02/02/practice_manual_review.pdf; BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/ 
2017/02/03/biapracticemanualfy2017.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2018). 
 73. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 72; BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL, 
supra note 72. 
 74. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 72. 
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ultimately sealed. Another may be a combination of the length of time 
immigration appeals take and the fact that this directorate was 
introduced just five years ago. Immigration Court and BIA judges may 
have a fair amount of immigration law experience before being 
appointed, but they are not offered training akin to that received by 
Asylum Officers. Federal appeals judges have extensive experience on the 
bench, but they run the risk of being even further removed from the 
issues facing potential refugees. Without specified training, judges’ 
familiarity with asylum issues likely lies in the types of cases they have 
already presided over. This may mean they are underinformed when it 
comes to making decisions on whether to reverse or uphold decisions by 
immigration officials. 
B. JUDICIAL BIAS AND MISUNDERSTANDING 
 Once a case has entered the referral or removal process, and 
depending on how far up the chain it gets appealed, those persons 
making status determinations will have varying degrees of separation 
from the Asylum Officers who originally heard the case. This leaves each 
case open for a judge’s inherent biases or fundamental misunderstanding 
of sexual orientation to potentially have a detrimental effect. As 
mentioned previously, it is difficult to find records of United States 
asylum cases, but some of the published opinions do offer insight into 
why judges could benefit from more in-depth training on the nature of 
LGBTI claims. 
Some decisions indicate that judgments were made by comparing 
asylum seekers to stereotypes of the LGBTI community. In 2007, 
Albanian native Daniel Shahinaj entered the United States illegally and 
applied affirmatively for asylum.75 Following the BIA’s ruling to uphold 
the Immigration Judge’s denial, the Eighth Circuit overturned the 
agency’s decision and granted Shahinaj’s petition for review. The court’s 
reasoning was based in part on “the IJ’s personal and improper opinion 
[that] Shahinaj did not dress or speak like or exhibit the mannerisms of 
a homosexual.”76 Other circuit court judges have overturned decisions in 
which Immigration Judges denied asylum seekers’ claims because the 
men were not effeminate or did not otherwise indicate their sexual 
orientation via appearance or behavior.77 The Eleventh Circuit, for 
example, has remanded a case “for a new factual hearing, free of any 
impermissible stereotyping or ungrounded assumptions about how gay 
men are supposed to look or act.”78 This indicates that biases and 
 75. Shahinaj v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1027, 1027 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 76. Id. at 1029. 
 77. See Razkane v. Holder, 562 F.3d 1283, 1286 (10th Cir. 2009); Todorovic v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
621 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 78. Todorovic, 621 F.3d at 1327. 
GROSS-69.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2018 4:05 PM 
April 2018]     NEITHER HERE NOR THERE 997 
fundamental misunderstandings of the LGBTI community are not 
confined to any one jurisdiction. 
C. BI-SPECIFIC ISSUES 
The struggles presented in cases involving sexual minorities can be 
exacerbated when the asylum seeker is bisexual because the answers to 
specific questions regarding sexual history or personal identification may 
seem somewhat ambiguous. The questions asked during interviews and 
trials seek to determine the degree of persecution the individual 
experienced while in their native country.79 In addition to testimony, the 
decisionmakers require proof of these claims, but may misinterpret 
situations in which claimants show having relationships or sexual contact 
with persons of more than one gender.80 If the decisionmaker 
misunderstands an asylum seeker’s experiences, it could lead to a 
judgment based on the belief that the individual is actually 
heterosexual.81 
At times, judges’ decisions can also falter in terms of a fundamental, 
but subconscious confusion about human sexual orientation, especially 
as far as bisexual claimants are concerned. For instance, the Sixth 
Circuit’s 2009 decision in Sempagala v. Holder denied a bisexual man 
asylum because it determined he could not prove his bisexuality or that 
he feared persecution in Uganda.82 The Immigration Judge found that 
although Sempagala claimed to be bisexual, he was “able to conceal” his 
relationship with a man, was “currently married to a woman and [had] 
not engaged in a same-sex relationship since [leaving] Uganda.”83 To 
state that someone must be heterosexual because they have been in a 
monogamous opposite-sex marriage demonstrates a fundamental 
misunderstanding of bisexuality. Further, the idea of being able to hide 
his same-sex relationship goes against the idea of granting asylum on the 
grounds of a trait that one should not be required to change. 
If Sempagala was decided today, the well-founded fear of 
persecution prong would be satisfied. However, whether the presiding 
judge would find credibility in Sempagala’s sexual orientation claim is 
uncertain. The fear of persecution prong not being satisfied at the time of 
the decision made the credibility of his bisexual claim less important to 
address on appeal. Nonetheless, this demonstrates why continued 
training can be crucial to impartiality. Since the Sempagala ruling, there 
have been more petitions granted for Ugandan citizens due to increases 
 79. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, INVISIBLE MAJORITY: THE DISPARITIES FACING BISEXUAL 
PEOPLE AND HOW TO REMEDY THEM 1, 12 (2016). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Sempagala v. Holder, 318 F.App’x 418, 420 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 83. Id.  
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in widespread political persecution and in legislative goals, including a 
death penalty for homosexual behavior.84 
Judicial rulings to date indicate that decisionmakers still have 
trouble separating a judgment of the asylum seeker’s credibility from 
their asserted sexual orientation. Ray Fuller, a former native of Jamaica, 
testified that he was married to a woman but had sexual relationships 
with several individuals, both male and female, from his pre-teen years 
until the hearing.85 Fuller presented reports of the criminalization and 
torture by police officers of LGBTI persons as evidence of the persecution 
faced in Jamaica.86 He also testified to being taunted for being gay and 
sliced with a knife, being robbed at gunpoint while being called a 
homophobic slur, being shot in the back while at a party with his 
boyfriend, and being disowned by his mother and sisters for his sexual 
orientation.87 Despite the evidence introduced, the Immigration Judge 
found issues with Fuller’s credibility due to inconsistencies between his 
documentation and testimony, as well as an inability to get any of his 
stated former lovers to testify in person.88 Chief Judge Lisa Wood of the 
Seventh Circuit denied Fuller’s appeal, but stated that if he were able to 
collect solid evidence to prove that the Immigration Judge erred in his 
determination of Fuller’s sexual orientation, he could make a motion to 
reopen his case.89 
In the dissent, Judge Richard Posner said it came as no surprise that 
Fuller was unable to provide further documentation or testimony to 
corroborate his sexual orientation because it is unlikely that LGBTI 
persons in Jamaica would risk making that information about 
themselves public.90 It can be hard for any asylum seeker to get former 
lovers to testify or even write letters when they are from a country that is 
known to persecute LGBTI persons because they fear outing and 
exposing themselves to the consequences.91 Judge Posner added that the 
Immigration Judge’s issues with Fuller’s credibility are either 
misconstrued or irrelevant to whether he is truly bisexual.92 Further, 
while it is more common for asylum seekers to call expert witnesses to 
establish their sexual identity, it would be acceptable for the Immigration 
Judge to call a psychologist to testify about the reliability of Fuller’s 
 84. SHARITA GRUBERG & RACHEL WEST, HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY: THE U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM’S 
ROLE IN PROTECTING GLOBAL LGBT RIGHTS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 7 (2015), 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/LGBTAsylum-final.pdf.  
 85. Fuller v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 866, 868 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 869–70. 
 89. Id. at 872. 
 90. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 91. Interview with Okan Sengun, supra note 8. 
 92. Fuller, 833 F.3d at 873. 
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claim. Had such an expert witness been called, then perhaps Chief Judge 
Wood could have avoided Judge Posner’s scrutiny regarding her ability 
to discern whether the Immigration Judge properly ruled on Fuller’s 
sexual orientation. Judge Posner ended by stating that “the weakest part 
of the Immigration Judge’s decision is that Fuller is not bisexual, a 
conclusion premised on the fact that he’s had sexual relations with 
women . . . Apparently the Immigration Judge does not know the 
meaning of bisexual.”93 
These two cases ended in denial of the claims for reasons that were 
stated to be separate from their characterization of sexual minorities.94 
However, the appellate decisions for both suggest that the judges at the 
Immigration Court level had a fundamental misunderstanding of 
bisexuality and the different ways in which it may manifest. This 
showcases ways in which continued training focused on LGBTI 
individuals may be necessary to ensure fairness in future cases. Up to this 
point, by upholding asylum denials on grounds other than sexual 
orientation, some courts have avoided the topic altogether.95 It is easier 
to say the outcome would have been different when one finds reasons not 
to address the core questions. By bringing judicial understanding in line 
with current social understandings, courts may better recognize certain 
characteristics of a bisexual identity and be prepared to review such cases 
appropriately. 
The national advocacy organization Immigration Equality compiled 
all the LGBTI and HIV asylum cases that reached United States Courts of 
Appeals between 1996 and 2012.96 Of over 150 LBGTI cases, only three 
were asylum seekers who asserted a bisexual orientation.97 Included in 
the heavier burden faced just to prove the legitimacy of their sexual 
orientation is a host of unique issues facing the bisexual subgroup. 
Bisexual asylum seekers’ petitions are granted at much lower rates 
than other sexual minorities,98 which could leave many feeling uneasy 
about their chances from the onset. However, if an asylum seeker were to 
apply only as gay or lesbian to improve their chances of being granted 
asylum, it could cause problems down the road. Should someone claim 
to be gay or lesbian to gain asylum and then fall in love with a person of 
the opposite gender, the asylee’s green card paperwork could be flagged 
 93. Id. at 871. 
 94. See Sempagala v. Holder, 318 F.App’x 418, 421–23 (6th Cir. 2009); Fuller, 833 F.3d at 870–72. 
 95. Holder, 318 F.App’x at 421–23; Fuller, 833 F.3d at 870–72. 
 96. See IMMIGRATION EQUALITY, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS GLBT AND HIV ASYLUM CASES—1996–
PRESENT (current through Oct. 28, 2012), http://www.immigrationequality.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/12/Final-Circuit-Chart-12-12.pdf. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Sean Rehaag, Bisexuals Need Not Apply: A Comparative Appraisal of Refugee Law and 
Policy in Canada, the United States, and Australia, 13 INT’L J. OF HUMAN RIGHTS 415, 422 (2009). 
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for potential removal on account of a dishonest asylum testimony.99 If 
this happens, the asylee would likely be given a chance to explain the 
inconsistency,100 but may face trouble proving to a judge that they are 
bisexual at all. There is also the potential for a perjury claim, which would 
further frustrate an individual’s asylum efforts. This scenario begs the 
question of why anyone who is lying about their sexual orientation for 
asylum purposes would claim to be bisexual, the subgroup with 
historically the lowest success rate, rather than homosexual. An 
argument could be made that a single heterosexual person seeking 
asylum would want to protect their right to marry later. However, the risk 
of being denied asylum outright is likely much higher than the benefits 
of that option. 
The argument that LGBTI individuals who do not fit a given 
stereotype could live as heterosexual to avoid persecution has been 
frowned upon in the RAIO directorate.101 This is akin to telling a biracial 
individual who can “pass” for a race that is not persecuted in their 
country that they should simply live as a member of that group in order 
to avoid persecution. However, non-monosexual sexual orientation is not 
as widely understood as someone’s ethnicity, and therefore judges in 
these cases may have the mindset that it is acceptable to believe that 
bisexual persons should consider the option of living a heterosexual 
lifestyle at home rather than becoming an asylee. This all infringes on the 
“should not be required to change” aspect of the immutability approach. 
However, the immigration and appellate courts are constructed to 
answer binary questions, and thus attempt to look at every claim as a “yes 
or no” question.102 This poses problems for bisexual individuals because 
a successful claim requires that judges step outside from a black and 
white approach to sexual orientation or gender identity to understand 
why those persons satisfy the particular social group requirement. These 
cases may depend on proving that past persecution can in part establish 
an asylum seeker’s fear of future persecution, because an existing 
reputation for being non-heterosexual in their country of origin makes 
the ability to appear heterosexual a moot point.103 
Another aspect of the asylum process that disproportionately affects 
LGBTI applicants is the one-year filing deadline.104 LGBTI persons in 
general may be suffering from traumatic effects of sanctioned 
persecution in their country of origin and may be afraid to come out to 
 99. Interview with Okan Sengun, supra note 8. 
 100. E-mail from Aaron Morris, Exec. Dir., Immigration Equality, to Author (Nov. 13, 2016, 07:08 
PST) (on file with Author). 
 101. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 6, at 41. 
 102. Sin, supra note 1, at 431. 
 103. Sin, supra note 1, at 431. 
 104. GRUBERG & WEST, supra note 84, at 23. 
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people in any government position.105 One who must disclose to another 
person what makes them eligible for asylum (because it may not be 
readily apparent) may understandably be apprehensive or distrustful due 
to a past riddled with persecution stemming from a third party’s 
knowledge of that very attribute. Additionally, an individual who is 
fleeing a country for fear of losing their life might not have had the time 
or forethought to gather enough evidence to meet the criteria for a  
well-founded fear of future persecution (or, in the case of withholding of 
removal, a fifty-one percent likelihood of future persecution).106 Finally, 
someone from a country that criminalizes or persecutes LGBTI people 
may not know that LGBTI status creates a potentially viable claim for 
asylum. In short, it may take longer than a year to declare their sexual 
orientation or find ways to prove it when they are coming from countries 
known to persecute people for nonheterosexuality.107 While this task 
could prove difficult for any LGBTI applicant, the heavier, more complex 
burden of proof facing bisexuals attempting to convince decisionmakers 
who do not understand their sexual identity puts that subgroup at a 
disadvantage. 
III.  CHANGING VIEWS OF IMMUTABILITY  
By adapting an equal protection approach,108 the immutability 
argument is historically one element of how LGBTI activists have 
confronted and overcome oppressive legal barriers.109 Arguing that a 
person’s sexual orientation is genetic and unchangeable allows LGBTI 
activists to make a persuasive case that the person should not face 
discrimination based on that characteristic.110 One legal issue with 
immutability claims, however, is that they define sexual orientation by 
how someone self-identifies according to attractions, rather than by 
same-sex behaviors.111 This can be problematic for fighting laws that 
target homosexual conduct, because “the law [does] not target 
‘orientation’ . . . only its behavioral manifestations.”112 If a bisexual 
individual engages in same-sex relationships, any persecution based on 
their orientation is likely much easier to present than that of one who is 
not. However, if the claimant has not acted (or acted publicly) on their 
self-identified orientation and persecutors are made aware of the 
 105. GRUBERG & WEST, supra note 84, at 26; see also MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra 
note 79, at 1, 12.  
 106. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 79, at 23. 
 107. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 79, at 26. 
 108. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 109. Lisa M. Diamond & Clifford J. Rosky, Scrutinizing Immutability: Research of Sexual 
Orientation and U.S. Legal Advocacy for Sexual Minorities, 53:4-5 J. OF SEX RES. 364, 365 (2016).  
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 375. 
 112. Id. at 365. 
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person’s sexual orientation in some other way, it may be harder for the 
claimant to prove a well-founded fear. 
A major issue when dealing with bisexual asylum seekers is the 
concern that claimants are being dishonest about their sexuality to gain 
refugee status.113 While there is the potential for people to abuse the 
system in this way, a refusal to acknowledge these claims as legitimate 
would mean reevaluating how one assesses any non-physical grounds for 
asylum. One could easily employ the same deceit with claims based on 
religious or political grounds because there often is no natural physical 
trait that ties an individual to that particular social group. It would also 
be just as hard to prove that someone is lying about their sexuality as it 
would be to prove that they are not. This is because many arguments 
made to prove one or the other would likely be a viable argument to the 
contrary. Not to mention, there is still the fact that bisexual claimants 
have the lowest percentage of success of any LGBTI subgroup in asylum 
cases and thus would be a risky deceit in the first place. 
The idea that gender identity and sexual orientation are immutable 
has grounded several landmark legal victories because it is the most 
easily explained rationale for granting equal rights.114 This, however, can 
present a problem for bisexuals, whose sexual orientation may appear to 
be more fluid than someone who is attracted only to people of the same 
or different genders. Bisexuality is often referred to as “invisible” in the 
legal arena because its complex nature disrupts the binary approach to 
sexuality that adjudicators are used to.115 It is easier for courts to make 
determinations according to monosexual viewpoints, and thus 
stereotyping or inflexibility of interpretations can occur and result in the 
denial of asylum petitions.116 While bisexuality might be seen as 
disruptive to an immutability argument, bisexuality, as any sexual 
orientation, is immutable.117 Thus, the issue seems to lie in how people 
define “immutable.” 
Bisexual people make up more than fifty-one percent of the LGBTI 
population.118 Regarding sexual fluidity, studies have not yielded any 
evidence to indicate that persons who see themselves as having an 
element of choice in their sexual orientation are less “biologically gay.”119 
Although the relationships of some bisexual people may take the form of 
 113. See Interview with Okan Sengun, supra note 8.  
 114. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 
686 (1973). 
 115. Heron Greenesmith, Drawing Bisexuality Back into the Picture: How Bisexuality Fits into 
LGBT Legal Strategy Ten Years After Bisexual Erasure, 17 CARDOZO J. OF L. & GENDER 65, 66 (2010); see 
also GRUBERG AND WEST, supra note 84; Rehaag supra note 98; Diamond and Rosky supra note 109. 
 116. Sin, supra note 1, at 431. 
 117. Greenesmith, supra note 115, at 73. 
 118. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 79. 
 119. Diamond & Rosky, supra note 109, at 372.  
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both same-sex and opposite-sex partnerships over time, the bisexual 
nature of their attractions itself can still be perceived as immutable.120 A 
person may have a choice in who their relationships are with, and they 
may choose partners of different genders at certain times, but the 
capability of being attracted to more than one gender is beyond their 
conscious control.121 
As early as 1985, the traditional view of immutability was not 
perceived as necessary in order for sexual minorities to prevail on an 
equal protection claim.122 Rather, the basis for heightened scrutiny could 
be grounded in political disenfranchisement and exposure to hostility.123 
Judge William Norris of the Ninth Circuit stated that the Supreme 
Court’s use of the word “immutable” is not meant to refer to traits that 
must be physically impossible to change or conceal.124 Rather, the Court 
will consider traits to be immutable if they are “so central to a person’s 
identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person 
for refusing to change them, regardless of how easy that change might be 
physically.”125 Just as religion, gender, skin color, citizenship, and other 
such traits can be perceived incorrectly, so too can sexual orientation.126 
The Supreme Court’s approach to immutability was further 
broadened in United States v. Windsor, when the Justices upheld the 
Second Circuit’s insistence that the test be “whether the characteristic of 
the class calls down discrimination when it’s manifest.”127 The Second 
Circuit aligned sexual orientation with other classifications that are 
evaluated using heightened scrutiny despite them being characteristics 
that “do not declare themselves, and often may be disclosed or 
suppressed as a matter of preference.”128 While Judge Norris made it 
clear that what we consider to be immutable is not necessarily 
unchangeable, the court in Windsor went a step further. This ruling 
demonstrates a shift away from the perspective that a person must see 
the trait as fundamental to their personality and a step toward the 
question of whether, upon manifestation, that trait triggers oppression. 
The Windsor approach shows progress in both legal and social 
understanding of sexuality in such a way that is important for other 
LGBTI legal protections as well. The way in which immutability has been 
 120. Diamond & Rosky, supra note 109, at 370. 
 121. Diamond & Rosky, supra note 109, at 368. 
 122. Diamond & Rosky, supra note 109, at 368. 
 123. Diamond & Rosky, supra note 109, at 374. 
 124. See Greenesmith, supra note 115, at 76; Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 
1989) (referring to interpretations of the Supreme Court’s use of “immutable”).  
 125. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726. 
 126. Id. 
 127. United States v. Windsor, 699 F.3d 169, 183 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
 128. Id. (referencing the Court’s decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 
440–41 (1985), in which alienage, illegitimacy, and national origin are among the classifications 
subject to heightened scrutiny). 
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addressed in the context of defending rights under the Equal Protection 
Clause can be applied to immigration law insofar as it presents a judicial 
framework for evaluating cases involving LGBTI litigants. There is a 
concern that abandoning a determination of whether a trait can be 
changed for one that looks at whether a person should be made to change 
it will present difficulties for litigants “who do not consider their sexual 
orientation to be a fundamental component of their personal identity.”129 
However, reframing the question and examining whether the trait plays 
a central role in the claimant’s life need not be mutually exclusive. 
Perhaps it would help close the gap for decisionmakers who view 
bisexuality as having a choice if the scenario was juxtaposed with that of 
persecution for religious beliefs. Rather than being viewed solely a choice 
of faith, religion may equally be seen as an inherent trait that forms one’s 
culture. Similarly, one’s choice of relationship is merely one aspect of a 
person’s broader sexual identity. While it is possible to change one’s 
religion, it seems unlikely that those who are persecuted for practicing a 
certain faith would be denied asylum on the grounds that they could 
simply choose to convert to a religion that is more accepted in their 
country of origin. 
The legal argument that benefits from how the question is phrased 
must go together with redefining “immutability” as well. As the definition 
moves away from meaning something that cannot change, perhaps the 
argument of its being fundamental to one’s identity can also be seen as 
incorrectly framed. Instead, moving forward, same-sex attraction should 
be seen as a trait that can and may manifest in a person, regardless of 
whether that person considers it a central aspect of their identity. It may 
simply be a characteristic that exists within them without being 
something they acknowledge or fight for each day, but should not render 
them undeserving of protection when its manifestation leads to 
persecution. 
Whether the individual gave much weight to their sexual identity 
prior to any same-sex experiences or persecution is less important than 
is the existence of a trait at the time a conflict occurred. It might be 
central to one’s being in the sense that the potential for same-sex 
attraction is a constant, even if it lays dormant at a given time. However, 
it does not need to be viewed as something the individual deems 
fundamental in the ways we tend to interpret that phrase. Anyone could 
potentially manifest a same-sex attraction, and thus fluidity should not 
invalidate immutability claims. Put simply, anytime someone manifests 
a same-sex attraction or a bisexual identity that elicits discrimination, 
that individual should qualify for equal protection. 
 129. Diamond & Rosky, supra note 109, at 376. 
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IV.  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
As discussed, two of the major issues facing bisexual asylum seekers 
are: (1) decisionmakers making determinations based on inherent biases 
or fundamental misunderstandings of what bisexuality is, and (2) a 
definition of “immutable” that does not encompass all sexual identities 
equally. Ideally, these two issues should be remedied. It is necessary for 
judges at both the immigration and appellate levels to make impartial, 
educated decisions about the claims of bisexual individuals. 
One means of addressing this issue is by introducing legislation that 
mandates that Immigration Judges be given LGBTI-centered training 
akin to the RAIO requirements discussed above. This would ensure that 
the courts are better prepared to review the initial decisions made by 
Asylum Officers. While judges spend years in the legal field before being 
appointed to the bench,130 there is no way to ensure that their 
understanding and experience are uniformly appropriate. The resulting 
risk is that even when Asylum Officers make an informed determination, 
judges not working with the same basic knowledge might send people 
back to the country in which they feared for their lives. The 2012 RAIO 
LGBTI update is more bi-inclusive and attempts to guide the officers 
through better procedures for evaluating less common sexual minority 
claims.131 Federal judges are required to preside over a plethora of 
practice areas, making it more difficult to thoroughly train them on every 
potential type of case they may encounter. However, Immigration Judges 
are responsible for creating the judicial records later reviewed by the 
federal judges when making appellate rulings. Therefore, judges who 
work exclusively on immigration matters should be just as well informed 
on LGBTI issues as the officers whose decisions they are reviewing. Not 
only would this provide more effective review, but detailed and 
knowledgeable written opinions may also help cut back the number of 
appeals if the reasons for each decision are better articulated. It is 
prudent that the Immigration Judges and BIA members who are 
reviewing Asylum Officer’s findings ought to be trained with similar 
substantive standards in addition to merely learning judicial procedure. 
Additionally, immigration courts could benefit from the Supreme 
Court setting a precedent that unquestionably determines the legal 
outlook on immutability. Of course, there is the danger of the Court 
defining immutability in such a way that adds to the difficulties for 
LGBTI asylum seekers rather than relieving them. As with many social 
justice movements, this possibility can be mitigated by advocates who 
remain patient and only bring cases which have the highest likelihood of 
 130. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2011) (stating that immigration judges are former attorneys appointed 
to the bench by the Attorney General). 
 131. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 6. 
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a favorable ruling. It should be explicitly confirmed through the Court 
that the UNHCR intended immutability to be one factor to consider, but 
it should be neither the sole basis for determining membership in a 
particular social group nor dispositive of credibility. Unfortunately, an 
outdated view of immutability seems to guide many immigration 
officials’ judgments as they believe bisexual individuals could simply 
choose to live a heterosexual lifestyle to avoid persecution. Yet, removing 
immutability from the equation altogether could be problematic in the 
face of how many civil rights victories have already been won using 
arguments with that label. Thus, it would be most beneficial to reframe 
the analysis which has excluded certain subgroups and instead employ 
the approach that the UNHCR envisioned. 
In addition to reducing the impact of the immutability factor, the 
Supreme Court is in the position to use previous rulings to redefine what 
“immutable” means. To do so consciously and effectively, they must have 
accurate factual findings from the lower courts. If Immigration Judges 
were required to undergo ongoing training similar to that of the Asylum 
Officers, the system as a whole would benefit. Not only would 
decisionmakers view asylum seekers through modern eyes that are more 
sensitive to a wide array of human situations, but the records they create 
for potential appellate use will be written with a deeper understanding of 
exactly what merits and shortcomings each asylum seeker offers. Traits 
that were once deemed unchangeable may not be so in the present day, 
because as society advances, certain characteristics have become more 
fluid. By offering judges a broader, more current understanding of how 
to define “immutable,” earlier sexual minority legal victories can be 
reconciled with more recent rulings that do not see fluid traits as 
necessarily being mutable. 
Over time, the characteristics that society thinks of as being 
immutable have shifted, and the courts’ jurisprudence should reflect this 
fact. Gender was at one time considered fundamentally unchangeable, 
but that is no longer the case. One’s status as an alien or as an illegitimate 
child have both long been legally changeable. In matters of religion, traits 
that are technically mutable are seen as being so essential to one’s 
identity that they should not be forced to change them. Although the 
notion of non-binary identities is still a relatively new concept to 
governmental matters, earlier cases laid the groundwork for judicial 
determinations to support their legitimacy. The fact that a person’s 
sexual orientation or their partners’ gender identity changes over time is 
not proof that the asylum claims lack credibility. Similar to the discussion 
in Windsor, the focus should be on whether or not their sexuality triggers 
persecution when it is manifest. Continuing to build a judicial record of 
rulings that supports this idea provides documentation crucial to 
influencing how bisexual individuals are perceived. This may affect the 
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ways in which they feel comfortable presenting themselves, which then 
has the potential to come full circle and inform how judges understand 
and evaluate bisexual asylum seekers. 
CONCLUSION 
Individuals seeking asylum in the United States are clearly held to a 
much stricter standard than are LGBTI Americans in terms of what is 
required for them to gain the protections offered here. At times, the 
government must make tough decisions about who to allow in, with the 
well-being of the entire country in mind. This, however, can perpetuate a 
subconscious presumption that citizens are telling the truth about their 
sexual orientation while the same courtesy is not offered to non-citizen 
asylum seekers. To be truly impartial in these determinations, judges 
must be knowledgeable about current psychological and social 
worldviews of sexual minorities. An individual’s focus on their sexuality 
may be solely out of caution for how they present themselves in their 
country of origin. The person may not necessarily see sexuality as a core 
element of their overall identity, but is forced to be aware of it more than 
any other inherent physical or behavioral trait so as not to be persecuted 
for it. Accordingly, asylum should not depend on a showing that one’s 
sexual orientation is otherwise remarkable. 
If the United States legal system cannot adapt its understandings of 
people from other cultures, especially in terms of the way LGBTI asylum 
cases are handled, then our country’s approach to human rights may be 
subject to harsh scrutiny. It shows inconsistencies in our political system 
if equal protection claims for sexual minorities are approached 
differently than asylum cases because it sends conflicting messages about 
which groups the United States deems worthy of legal protections. Under 
the “particular social group” umbrella, United States asylum laws are 
already written with the intent to protect LGBTI individuals, including 
bisexuals. However, the interpretation of these laws regarding bisexual 
individuals is often skewed by the existing viewpoints of immigration 
officials. The fact that Immigration Judges and the BIA have full 
discretion when presiding in asylum cases means the government has an 
interest in educating them to avoid inherent biases and negative 
stereotyping as much as possible. By intertwining continued LGBTI 
sensitivity training and creating a judicial record of how to accurately 
define and apply immutability, the views of immigration officials can be 
brought in line with current social perspectives. Once immigration 
officials understand that neither bisexuality nor sexual fluidity invalidate 
an analysis of immutability, advocates for the bisexual community can 
begin to shape how our judicial and legislative systems function 
regarding bisexual and other non-monosexual asylum seekers. 
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